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Introduction
An Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), similarly to other alternative climate change policy instruments, is expected to lead to new costs for companies, because it requires firms to either buy permits to pollute or, alternatively, to bear the cost of abating emissions 1 . Therefore, according to the traditional view, an emission trading system is likely to decrease firm's economic performance (Coase, 1981; Baumol and Oates, 1988) .
Indeed, companies subjected to the EU ETS, which is the scheme introduced by the European Union in 2005 to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, have always claimed the risks of losing jobs, reduced competitiveness and decreased market share relative to companies outside the EU ETS (with the extreme case of re-location to unregulated countries). Therefore, analyses that attempt to address this issue are of strong policy interest for both industrial emitters and policymakers (Martin et al., 2014a) . In particular, it is relevant to analyze the economic effects of the European scheme, because this scheme constitutes the most important policy tool for climate change mitigation of the European Union and the largest carbon trading market implemented in the world thus far.
Empirical ex-post analyses on the impact of the EU ETS on firm performance have attained mixed conclusions. Certain studies have found positive or not significant effects of the EU ETS on economic performance of companies, whereas other papers have found negative effects or no impact at all (Martin et al., 2015 , Convery, 2009 ). Our paper investigates the effect of the EU ETS on firm-level economic and financial indicators. As opposed to other recent studies, we evaluate a larger variety of measures 1 An ETS works in the following way: the Regulator, at the beginning of the compliance period, allocates a number of emission allowances (or permits) to the regulated plants, thus setting a maximum cap for pollution. The plants then can trade the allowances according to their pollution needs: plants that need to pollute more will buy permits, whereas plants that need to pollute less will sell permits. At the end of each compliance period, participants to the scheme are required to surrender as much permits as their verified emissions. of performance. Thus, our paper describes a broader picture of the phenomenon under analysis and thus provides new insights into the mixed results found in the literature to date. Our analysis is based on a large panel of European firms and our results show how the economic/financial indicators of the ETS firms have evolved relatively to similar firms that were not involved in the ETS during the first and second phases of the EU ETS (2005-2007 and 2008-2012) 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the recent evidence on the evaluation of the impact of the EU ETS on firm performance. Section 3 describes the data used for our empirical analysis. Section 4 discusses the empirical strategy we adopt. Results are discussed in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. Martin et al. (2015) reviewed the empirical evidence on the impact of the EU ETS on various dimensions and pointed out that EU ETS ex-post evaluations are "still very much work in progress". Most empirical studies on the effect of the EU ETS on firm economic performance are very recent, and not many have previously passed the refereeing process of academic journals. These studies differ substantially in terms of empirical strategy, sectoral and geographical scope and the selection of indicators that they evaluate.
Literature review
There are studies that focus solely on one European country. Wagner et al. (2014) found a negative effect of EU ETS on employment on a panel of French firms. In contrast, Petrick and Wagner (2014) found no significant effect of the EU ETS on employment for a sample of German firms. They also analyzed the impact of EU ETS on gross output and exports and found no effect on gross output in the first phase but a significant and positive effect in the second phase; however, a positive and significant effect of on export was found in both phases. Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) a similar analysis on revenues and employment on German firms related solely to the first phase of the EU ETS. They found no significant effects.
Other studies cover a larger selection of European countries. Abrell et al. (2011) investigated the effect of EU ETS on profit margins, value added and employment on a dataset of European companies; for their analysis, they combined data from the EU ETS Transaction Log with the Amadeus database (Bureau van Dijk). They found no significant impact of the EU ETS on profit margins and value added and a small, but significant, negative effect on employment.
Early studies solely investigated the first phase of the EU ETS. Commins et al.
(2009) studied the impact of EU ETS on total factor productivity (TFP), returns to capital, employment and tangible investments on a sample of European firms. They found a negative effect for TFP and returns to capital but no significant effect for employment and tangible investments. Martin et al. (2015) concluded that "one priority for future research on the EU ETS is the further development of firm-level micro-data, in terms of both outcome variables available and geographical coverage".
Our contribution to this emerging literature is manifold. Compared to existing studies, (i) we evaluate a larger selection of outcome variables, (ii) on a larger selection of EU countries, and (iii) we evaluate how the effect of the EU ETS differs according to various observable characteristics of firms.
Data
EU ETS allowances are allocated at the installation level, not at the company level 3 .
Information regarding obligated installations, their respective account holders, compliance and transaction data is stored within the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL). For our firm-level analysis, it is essential to establish the link between these EU ETS accounts at the installation level and the corresponding parent companies.
However, limited and/or incomplete information is provided on the associated firms in the EUTL 4 .
The "Ownership links and enhanced European Transaction Log dataset project" (Jaraite et al., 2013) is the outcome of the matching of the EU ETS accounts at the installation level to their parent companies 5 . However, the years covered by this database are from 2005 to 2007, which corresponds to the first phase of the EU ETS. To extend the matching of this database to the second phase, we assume that new companies have not entered the market starting from the second phase and that companies participating in the first phase continue to participate in the second phase. 6
The matching between installations and companies performed by Jaraite et al. (2013) assigns installations to the ultimate owner that can be linked to the company identifier of Bureau van Dijk's databases. Amadeus, by Bureau van Dijk, is a database of comparable financial and business information of European companies and includes standardized annual accounts (consolidated and unconsolidated), financial ratios, sectoral activities and ownership data. Because the EU ETS began in 2005 and because we want to observe a sufficiently large pre-treatment period, we extend the current release of Amadeus (extracted in July 2014, coverage 2004-2012) with a previous release of Amadeus (firms observed from 2002 to 2010).
Our operative sample is composed of 792 treated firms and 65,692 potential controls observed over the 2002-2012 period. We keep those firms based in EU ETS countries (EU28 plus Norway, Lichtenstein and Norway), whereas we include all sectors in the 4 National unique identifiers of companies that own EU ETS installations, as reported in the 'List of installation in the Union Registry', are missing or assigned to direct owners rather than to ultimate owners. Moreover, they are not compatible with the usable identifier in Amadeus in many cases (we use Amadeus for the construction of our dataset, as explained fore after). 5 The dataset is available at http://fsr.eui.eu/CPRU/EUTLTransactionData.aspx 6 To check how important this assumption is, we evaluate the amount of emissions in installations that entered the scheme in phase 2 only (Table 13 in Appendix A). This amounts to only 7.5 percent of verified emissions in the period 2008-2012. economy 7 : many firms that operate in typically non-ETS sectors (e.g., the service sectors) continue to own establishments that are covered by the EU ETS.
To reduce the heterogeneity of our sample, we keep only the companies that have, on average, more than 10 employees. 8 Depending on the variable of interest, the extent to which our panel of firms is unbalanced may change, perhaps substantially. Our choice about firms that cannot be observed over the entire period has been to keep, for each variable, only those firms that appear at least once in each of our periods of interest:
pre-treatment period (2002) (2003) (2004) , first phase (2005) (2006) (2007) and second phase (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) . As a robustness check, we also keep only those firms (treated and controls) for which we observe our variable of interest for all years: this reduces the bias from attrition; however, in some cases, this substantially reduces the number of treated firms that we are consider (refer to paragraph 5.2).
Estimation approach 4.1 Identification strategy
The challenge related to the empirical ex-post policy evaluations of the EU ETS is to establish a causal link between the policy itself and the changes in the outcome variable:
this means that any change in the outcome variable can be ascribed only to the policy and not to a third factor that affects all treated firms. To analyze the causal impact of the EU ETS, we apply a difference-in-differences approach with pre-treatment matching.
The treatment group is constituted by the firms that own at least one establishment that 7 The only exception is represented by the exclusion of the aviation sector (NACE code 51). The aviation sector (flights within and from the EU, Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein) has been included in the scheme since year 2012. Differently from other sectors, for which fixed sources above certain thresholds are included, no matter the sector of operation of the firm, in the aviation sector permits and emissions refer to mobile sources (aircrafts). The difference in the timing of adoption of the policy, coupled with the substantially different potential impact on the sector, motivate this exclusion.
participates in the EU ETS, whereas the control group is composed of similar non-EU ETS firms.
As discussed by Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2015) , matching on observable characteristics is problematic when dealing with establishment-level data. This is due to the assignment rule of the EU ETS: the scheme covers all plants operating in participating countries that have installed capacity above certain sector-specific thresholds 9 . This means that it is not possible to find a good match for an ETS establishment given that any other establishment with the same size (in terms of installed capacity) operating in the same sector should be treated too. As suggested by Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2015) , however, the following situation may occur when the unit of observation is the company instead of the establishment: within the same sector and size class (not in terms of installed capacity, but in terms of employment, assets or turnover), there may exist at least one company that has one or more plants that are sufficiently large to be covered by the EU ETS and at least one company with no plants that meet the criteria for participating to the EU ETS. However, because the size and sector (and other features) of the company matters more for overall company performance than does installed capacity of each and every establishment, when using the firm as the unit of analysis, it is possible to have a common support between the treated and the control group in terms of observable characteristics.
The treatment begins in 2005. The first phase of the EU ETS (2005) (2006) (2007) was a pilot phase: no banking or borrowing of permits with the subsequent phase was allowed and allowances were allocated for free ("grandfathering" 10 ). The second phase began in 2008 and incorporated some tighter provisions, e.g. higher penalty for non-compliance (from 40€ per ton of CO 2 in the first phase to 100€ per ton), inclusion of N 2 O emissions and possibility of banking or borrowing of permits. Therefore, we expect more negative effects of the EU ETS on firm performance during the second phase. However, grandfathering remained the default allocation method also during the second phase.
We evaluate the impact of the EU ETS on the following list of measures of economic and financial performance: value added (VA), number of employees (L), turnover, investment (gross fixed capital formation -GFCF), labour productivity (VA/L), average wages (average labour compensation per employee), return on investment (ROI), total factor productivity (TFP) 11 and markup 12 . Monetary variables, expressed in euro, have been deflated to 2005 prices using country-sector-variable specific deflators from Eurostat.
To identify the impact of the EU ETS on firm's performance, we estimate the following econometric model:
(
where:
 α i is the firm fixed effect; 11 We estimate TFP using the procedure developed by Ackerberg et al (2006) after estimating a translog production function separately for each two-digit industry. As a lag in the input of the production function is needed, TFP can only be estimated from year 2003 onwards. 12 Estimates of firm-specific markups are based on the procedure developed by De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). Markups are computed as the ratio between labour share of total costs and the elasticity of value added to labour input which is estimated with a translog production function. As a lag in the input of the production function is needed, markups can only be estimated from year 2003 onwards.
 is a time-invariant dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that own at least one establishment subject to the EU ETS;
 represents a dummy that equals one for the years of the first phase of the 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012;  are sector dummies and country dummies interacted with a linear trend;
 are year dummies;
 is the idiosyncratic error term.
Our parameters of interest are and that represent, respectively, the average treatment effect on the treated for phase 1 (2005) (2006) (2007) and phase 2 (2008-2012) of the EU ETS compared with the pre-treatment period (2003) (2004) . We are also interested in testing whether a difference exists in the effect that we estimate for the two phases. This is done by testing the null hypothesis of equality between the average treatment effect on the treated for the two phases ( ).
Although the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of firms is removed by including firm-specific fixed effects 13 , it could be the case that there exist other unobserved time-varying components that correlate both with the likelihood of being treated and firm's performance. To control for these unobserved components, we include year dummies to control for EU-wide shocks that hit all countries and sectors in the same manner, country-specific linear trends that allow for differences in trends across countries (as a consequence, for example, to different macro-economic conditions or changes in the regulatory attitude that occurred within each country) and
sector-specific linear trends that allow for differences in trends across sectors (due to, among other things, sector-specific trends in global demand and prices or to EU-wide changes in regulatory attitude towards specific sectors). 13 The fixed effect is also particularly useful to control for panel attrition. Firms that are absent from the panel in particularly 'bad' or 'good' years could have influenced substantially our estimates of and .
We match treated and control companies based on the propensity score (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985) . The propensity score is the estimated probability of being treated given a set of observable characteristics of treated and untreated units. The use of a single synthetic variable that combines information about a variety of dimensions eliminates the dimensionality issue and allows to exploit efficiently the information contained in continuous variables. Conditional on the propensity score, the treatment is expected to be independent and the identification of the average treatment effect on treated is achieved.
We first estimate, by means of a probit estimator, a propensity score that is function of a basic set of variables measured in year 2003. We include the following variables:
number of employees (in log), growth of the number of employees from 2003 to 2004, capital intensity (log of fixed assets per employee), value added per employee (in log), age of the company, country dummies and sector dummies (2 digits NACE rev 1.1).
[ Tables and figures   Table 1 about here]
Results of the aggregate propensity score are reported in Tables and figures   Table 1 . As expected, the probability of being covered by the EU ETS is significantly and positively correlated with size (number of employees), capital intensity (stock of fixed capital per employee) and age of the firm. Conditional on these characteristics, firms that grow faster (growth in employment between 2003 and 2004) are more likely to be covered by the EU ETS: this may indicate a potential systematic difference in trends between treated firms and other firms. Finally, (unreported) industry and country dummies are strongly significant in predicting the likelihood of owning EU ETS establishments.
To tighten the matching and to accommodate the different distribution of missing values for each of our measures of performance 14 , we estimate a different propensity score for each measure, in which we add to the basic set of covariates the pre-treatment level (2003) and growth rate (2003) (2004) of the specific measure under scrutiny. In this way we are balancing the pre-treatment performance as well as the pre-treatment trends in the outcome variables.
After having estimated the propensity scores, we match each ETS firm a maximum of 10 nearest neighbours (in terms of estimated propensity score) non-ETS firms. To reduce the risk of selecting firms that are not sufficiently similar to treated firms, we also impose a caliper of 0.05: controls firms that are not sufficiently similar (i.e. the distance in terms of the estimated probability of being treated with the corresponding treated firm is greater than 5 percent) are not included in the counterfactual, even if they fall in the group of the 10 nearest neighbours. The number of treated and matched control companies by country is reported in Table 2 , whereas Table 3 shows the number of treated and matched control companies by sectors. Interestingly, the number of EU ETS firms that have no suitable match within the caliper that we define (i.e. they are off support) is small for all variables, ranging from 8 firms for ROI, turnover and employment to 1 for investments. In accordance with Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2015), we decided to exclude these firms from our analysis rather than match them with substantially different untreated firms that could not act credibly as their counterfactual.
Another interesting observation concerns the differences across different measures in terms of the number of treated and potential control firms. The smallest coverage is for markup and TFP. The estimation of these two measures requires observing their employment, capital stock, value added and turnover (also wage bill for markup) for at least two consecutive years. Coverage is also rather low for investment (GFCF) as many firms only invest sporadically. Finally, descriptive statistics about our set of performance measures are reported in Table 4 .
[ Table 2 , Table 3 and Table 4 about here] treatment, phase 1, phase 2), as other firms would not be included in the difference-in-differences regressions.
In Table 5 , we report pre-treatment differences in the level (2003) and growth rate (2003) (2004) of our set of measures of performance between ETS and non-ETS firms.
Differences are reported for the whole potential sample of 'control' firms ('unmatched') and for the sample that is matched based on the propensity score, as described above ('matched').
[ 
Results
Before discussing the results of our estimates, it is worth evaluating descriptive trends in average measures of economic performance for treated and control firms (matched controls solely, weighted by matching weights) over the period that we consider (Figure 1 ).
[ Figure 1 about here]
A few clear patterns appear by evaluating average trends in treated and control firms. [ Table 6 about here]
Baseline results
Aggregate descriptive evidence for employment, investments 15 and turnover is generally confirmed by our statistical analysis: the difference between treated and controls is already significant since the first phase for turnover and investments (and remains significant, larger and stronger in the second phase), though it becomes significant only in the second phase for employment. The acceleration of the divergence between the two groups from the first to the second phase of the EU ETS is significant for all three variables. The effects are rather big in magnitude: compared to their control group in the second phase of the EU ETS, treated firms, have increased their employment by 7.9 log points (8.2 percent), their investment by 23.7 log points (26.7 percent) and their turnover by 13.9 log points (14.9 percent).
Value added increased slightly less than turnover (5.8 log points, 6 percent); the effect is significant solely for the second phase of the EU ETS. This suggests that the EU ETS, while driving up sales, has also increased material and other variable costs (that represent the difference between turnover and value added) more than proportionally.
No significant effect on average wages and labour productivity (VA/L) is detected.
We observe negative effects on TFP, profitability (ROI) and markups, the latter being significant only in the first phase. However, the magnitude of the effects is modest: TFP is reduced by about 1.6 percent in the first phase and by about 2.4 percent in the second phase, ROI is reduced by about 0.4-0.5 percent, that corresponds to less than one tenth of its sample interquartile range, in both phases. and markup is reduced by 1.5 percent. 15 Results for investments should be interpreted with caution as this variable is intrinsically unbalanced:
firms invest in fixed capital in an intermittent way, with large investments often followed by one or more periods (years) of absence of positive gross investments. As we only consider observations with strictly positive observed investments, our results for this variable can be generalized only to the population of firms that perform investments in every period.
All in all, the EU ETS appears to have positively influenced the scale of treated firms, measured in terms of turnover, value added, employment and investment. The only negative effects that are detected are on scale-free variables and they are small in magnitude. Summing up, our estimates suggest that the EU ETS, despite its negative (but small) impacts on productivity and profitability, has stimulated the growth of firms that own treated establishments.
An explanation for these results might be that the EU ETS, by imposing additional We detect stronger positive effects in the second phase (except in the case of ROI):
this means that the effect of the EU ETS as an incentive to increase the scale has reinforced during the second phase. The negative effects have reinforced only in the case of ROI.
Robustness checks
As a first robustness check, we also repeat our analysis while tightening the matching algorithm and considering only the closest, in terms of estimated propensity score, untreated firm for each treated firm (nearest neighbour approach). Although the combination of a large pool of potential control firms and the requirement for matched firm to lie within a caliper reduce the risk of matching firms that are too different from treated ones, one nearest neighbour matching may help in estimating a lower bound of our effects, at the cost of selecting matches that are only 'accidentally' similar to treated firms. Results are reported in Table 7 .
[ Table 7 about here]
Although the direction of the effects remains unaffected, we observe some differences with respect to our baseline estimates for what concerns the actual magnitude of the effects as well as their statistical significance. The positive impact on investment and turnover now appears only in the second phase of the EU ETS.
Conversely, the impact on value added and ROI turns out to be not statistically significant. Finally, the size and statistical significance of the effect for markup and employment for the first and second phases, respectively, are now larger and stronger.
As a second robustness check, we evaluate the stability of our results when considering only the samples for which we observe our outcome variable for all years (Table 8) . 16 [ Table 8 about here] For many variables we observe a rather large drop in the number of observations and in the number of treated firms as a consequence of imposing a balanced panel structure.
Also in this case, results are qualitatively very similar to our baseline estimates. In contrast to our baseline estimates, however, we observe lack of significance in the first phase for turnover, investment and markup and in the second phase for employment.
The effect of the EU ETS on specific categories of firms
To have a more detailed and deeper understanding of the role played by the EU ETS in influencing economic performance of firms, we examine how the effect of the EU ETS varies with the following observable features of treated firms: firm-specific and sector-specific emission intensity, active involvement in the exchange of permits and propensity to innovate.
We expect negative interaction effects of ETS for larger emitters and sectors that are systematically more emission-intensive, positive ones for firms that are actively 16 We also re-estimate our propensity scores to accommodate for the new samples.
involved in the trading of permits and for firms that patent in environment-related fields. Firms and sectors that rely on emission-intensive processes are likely to suffer more (or gain less) from carbon pricing because this represents a greater share of their costs relative to less emission-intensive firms and sectors.
We do not expect important gains for firms that are active in trading pollution allowances. Firms that are active in the permits market can profit from trading and, the interpretation of the interaction terms, we re-scaled the emission intensity variables to have the minimum observed emission intensity (in log) equal to zero.
[ Table 9 and Table 10 about here]
In the first phase, companies with higher emissions reduced their employment and ROI more than companies with lower emissions did, whereas a negative and significant interaction term is estimated for turnover in the second phase. Results for other variables are far from statistically significant. When examining differences across sectors that are characterized by different emission intensities, we estimate negative and statistically significant interaction effects of the EU ETS for value added, labour productivity and average wages, but a weakly significant and positive effect is found for ROI in the second phase only. Excluding this latter result, the other estimates confirm that emission-intensive firms and sectors have been generally penalized by the EU ETS.
We observe a penalization in terms of wages and labour productivity. A doubling in the emission intensity corresponds, in the second phase, to a decrease in average wages of 2.8 percent and to a decrease in labour productivity of 5.3 percent.
A second dimension that we consider as a possible source of heterogeneity in the effect of the EU ETS on firm performance is the involvement of firms in trading pollution permits. The variable "Active" represents the trade activity status and is equal to one when the company has traded at least once in the market for permits during the first or the second phase. Data on trade activity status originates from the EUTL registry. Results are reported in Table 11 .
[ Table 11 about here]
Being active in trading emission permits has a minimal influence on the impact of the EU ETS on firm performance. We only find some differences, in the first phase, for employment (negative interaction effect), labour productivity and average wages (positive interaction effect). The absence of differential effects in the second phase may indicate the limited possibility of 'playing around' in the permits market to reduce the cost of compliance. This absence of effects may be partly explained by the large drop in the price of carbon that was observed in the second phase of the EU ETS, which limited the potential losses from non-trading and the gains from trading. [ Table 12 about here]
An interaction positive effect for patenting firms is detected for labour productivity, ROI and markup (the latter only in the first phase). These differential effects tend to be large in magnitude. It should be noted that these effects involve only scale-free measures of economic performance. This is totally in line with the Porter Hypothesis, which states that more innovative companies gain in terms of productivity in comparison to non-innovative ones.
Conclusions
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the EU ETS on the economic performance of firms that own facilities that participate in the scheme. Our empirical approach aims at creating a proper counterfactual for treated firms in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment effect. Moreover, we attempt to identify differences in these effects across firms with different observable characteristics.
Our results suggest that the EU ETS has positively affected scale-related measures of economic performance and negatively, but slightly, influenced scale-free ones, especially so in the second phase. Our explanation for this finding is that the EU ETS, by imposing additional fixed costs, has increased the minimum efficient productive scale of treated firms.
Moreover, we observe that emission-intensive firms and sectors have been characterized by a slightly worse economic performance, firms that have been active in trading allowances have not improved their performance remarkably and, lastly, firms that have patented in environment-related technology fields have witnessed a better performance in some scale-free dimensions of economic performance.
The results discussed in this paper provide a quantification on how the EU ETS influences a wide range of measures of performance. Further work is needed to better understand the mechanisms through which the EU ETS actually influence performance.
The Porter Hypothesis (Porter and van der Linde, 1995) can be a possible explanation of a positive effect of the EU ETS on firm performance (in the cases of value added, employment and turnover). Porter and van der Linde (1995) stated that environmental policies that stimulate green innovation may lead to positive innovation-related outcomes, which can, in turn, more than offset the negative effect of compliance costs on competitiveness and economic performance. We partially capture this effect with the interaction effect between our policy and environmental patenting activity. Another possible explanation may be the lobbying activity exercised by EU ETS companies and sectors on European authorities (Markussen and Svendsen, 2005; Svendsen, 2005;  BÖringer and Rosendahl, 2009). EU ETS companies and sectors may have been able to obtain favourable conditions. For example, they obtained the grandfathering of permits in the first two phases and exemption from auctioning in the third phase (2013) (2014) (2015) (2016) (2017) (2018) (2019) (2020) for sectors deemed to be exposed to the risk of carbon leakage, (see Martin et al., Millions of tons of verified CO 2 emissions. Own elaboration on the EU-CITL data
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Appendix A -Verified emissions in establishments active in the second phase only
